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I. Introduction  
Establishing production facilities in a country that imposes the protectionist measure, 
thereby bypassing trade protectionist measure is one of the most common explanations 
for foreign direct investment (FDI). This is known as the “tariff-jumping” FDI. 
Grossman and Helpman (1994) point out that enterprises will open markets in foreign 
target markets through direct investment, even though they may face losses temporarily 
so as to reduce the impact of trade protection. The initial research focused on the impact 
of tariff, quota and VER on FDI. More recently, the use of trade remedies such as anti-
dumping (AD), countervailing duty (CVD) and safeguard measures have received more 
attention from scholars as tariff has been greatly reduced with global trade liberalization. 
A typical example of tariff-jumping FDI1 was the huge influx of Japanese firms in auto 
and electronics industry in the U.S. and Europe during the 1970s and the 1980s. 
Substantial empirical works have confirmed the existence of tariff-jumping FDI in the 
case of Japan. Azrak and Wynne (1995) use a sample of 58 Japanese manufacturing 
companies in the U.S. for over 14 years and find the Japanese FDI influenced by the 
                         
1 In this case, “remedy-jumping” FDI would be a more precise description for FDI induced by trade remedies. But 
rather than referring the phenomenon as “remedy-jumping” FDI, this paper stick to the wording of “tariff-
jumping” FDI by convention.  
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state of the economy in the U.S. and the likelihood of protectionist action. Blonigen 
and Feenstra (1997) confirm a substantial effect of the threat of protection on non-
acquisition Japanese FDI in the U.S. using an industry-level dataset from 1981 to 1988. 
Belderbos and Sleuwaegen (1997) find firm-level evidence of tariff-jumping FDI as a 
substitute for export from Japan using a dataset on plant establishments in Europe and 
the U.S. for 120 Japanese firms and 36 electronics products. Using a cross-section time-
series dataset, Barrell and Pain (1999) find the scale and location of Japanese 
investment significantly influenced by protectionist measures controlling for market 
size and relative labor costs over the 1980s.  
Along with studies on tariff-jumping FDI, a majority of papers have tried to explain 
the emergence of such protection-induced FDI as a quid pro quo that defuses future 
threat of protection. The concept of quid pro quo FDI introduced by Bhagwati et al. 
(1987) suggests that protection-induced FDI occurs to defuse protectionist threats in 
the future period rather than to bypass the actual protectionist measures. One of the 
most typical examples is the concession made between Japanese carmakers and the U.S. 
in the 1990s. Threatened with a 100% prohibitive tariff on luxury cars under Section 
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301 investigation, Japanese automakers compromised and responded by substantially 
expanding their plants in the U.S. However, some scholars have pointed out that such 
quid pro quo FDI might not be general. For example, Dinopoulos (1989) show that quid 
pro quo FDI may not occur because of a free-rider problem. That is to say, if future 
protectionist threats can be defused by such FDI, all firms in the industry that export to 
the host country will benefit even if they don’t establish foreign plants by themselves. 
In turn, this will result in no firms taking the initiative to establish plants. For this reason, 
the existence of quid pro quo FDI still remains a question.  
In the case of China, there has been an increasing number of protectionist measures 
including AD, CVD investigations and safeguard measures initiated against China in 
recent years. Meanwhile China has seen a surge in its outward FDI in the past decade. 
The growing protectionism against China and increasing outward FDI resemble the 
1980s Japanese case to a great extent. However, most existing papers on the 
determinants of Chinese outward FDI have built their theories based on Dunning’s OLI 
framework which mainly focused on the market, resource and strategic asset seeking 
purposes. In particular, Buckley et al. (2007) find Chinese businesses tend to invest in 
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countries with high levels of political risk, large market size, high geographic proximity 
and rich natural resource endowment. Zhang and Daly (2011) find China’s overseas 
investment attracted to countries with high export volumes from China, large GDP per 
capita, rapid GDP growth, open economic regimes and abundant resources. 
Nonetheless, little attention has been paid to trade barrier as a potential incentive for 
FDI. This paper intends to fill the blanks in the relevant literatures through an empirical 
study on the relationship between trade remedies and FDI in the case of China.   
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. The next section provides an 
overview on the use of trade remedies against China in recent years and the 
characteristics of Chinese outward FDI. Section III specifies the econometric model 
based on tariff-jumping FDI hypothesis, elaborates the empirical strategy used in this 
paper and describes the data. Section IV presents and analyses the empirical results. 
Section V concludes with some implications and limitations of the findings. 
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II. Background Overview  
1. Trade Remedies against China 
Since the first anti-dumping investigation launched against China by European 
Community in 1979, the filing of protection measures targeting China has increased at 
a rapid pace. Among all measures, anti-dumping duties far outpace other remedies such 
as countervailing duties and safeguard measures. According to the WTO anti-dumping 
database, the average number of anti-dumping investigations targeting China has 
soared more than 10 times from 6.3 per year in the 1980s to 63.9 per year in the 2010s. 
China has been the top one subject of new anti-dumping investigations for the past 23 
years with an affirmative rate of over 73%, which is also the highest in the world. 
Especially, from 2005 to 2017, China has received 30% of total anti-dumping initiations 
around the world, of which most investigations come from the U.S. and EU. China also 
topped the total number of subsidy and countervailing duty investigations from 1995 to 
2017. It is worth noting that considering the status of the U.S. and EU in the WTO, 
trade remedy measures taken by the U.S. and EU have strong demonstration effects to 
other WTO members, meaning a successful affirmative case by the U.S. or EU tends 
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to encourage other countries to invoke same investigations against China as well. For 
example, after the U.S. imposed a 35% punitive tariff on Chinese tires in 2009, Brazil, 
Argentina and India also initiated anti-dumping investigations on Chinese tire products.  
Figure 1. Number of AD Initiations and Measures against China, 1995-2017 
 
Source: WTO anti-dumping database  
Figure 2. Number of CVD Initiations and Measures against China, 1995-2017 
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In terms of sectoral distribution, China received most anti-dumping and 
countervailing investigations in base metals and articles, followed by chemical and 
allied industries, machinery and electrical equipment, resins, plastics and articles, 
rubber and articles and textiles. Anti-dumping cases in these industries accounted for 
more than 75% of total investigations, all of which are labor intensive and low value-
added industries. For safeguard measures, steel products, ceramic titles, textile products, 
tires and solar panels are the major sectors that have been targeted in trade disputes. 
Table 1. Sectoral Distribution of AD and CVD Initiations against China, 1995-2017 
Sector  AD Initiation CVD Initiation 
I. Live animals and products 2 0 
II. Vegetable products 9 0 
III. Animal and vegetable fats, oils and waxes 0 0 
IV. Prepared foodstuff; beverages, spirits, vinegar; tobacco 6 1 
V. Mineral products 16 0 
VI. Products of the chemical and allied industries 235 14 
VII. Resins, plastics and articles; rubber and articles 101 9 
VIII. Hides, skins and articles; saddlery and travel goods 5 0 
IX. Wood, cork and articles; basket ware 23 4 
X. Paper, paperboard and articles 32 7 
XI. Textiles and articles 100 4 
XII. Footwear, headgear; feathers, artificial flowers, fans 22 0 
XIII. Articles of stone, plaster; ceramic prod.; glass 89 3 
XV. Base metals and articles 374 68 
XVI. Machinery and electrical equipment 146 12 
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XVII. Vehicles, aircraft and vessels 30 5 
XVIII. Instruments, clocks, recorders and reproducers 19 0 
XX. Miscellaneous manufactured articles 60 2 
Source: WTO anti-dumping database; WTO subsidies and countervailing measures database 
There are many reasons why China became the top one target for protectionist 
measures. For one thing, China’s tremendous trade volume and rapid export growth 
rate put pressure on many firms in importing countries. However, another important 
reason may be attributed to the surrogate country approach in determining the normal 
value of Chinese exports. 
Under the WTO, the “normal value” of a good is determined under the assumption 
that the exporting country is a market economy. In the situation where a product is 
imported from a non-market economy (NME, economy where the government has a 
complete or substantially complete monopoly of its trade and where all domestic prices 
are fixed by the State), Article VI of the GATT 1994 (“Anti-Dumping Agreement”) do 
not recognize a strict comparison with home market prices as appropriate. In such cases, 
WTO members can use a surrogate country approach which uses the costs of production 
in a third country to calculate the value of products from an NME.  
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When China was accepted as a WTO member in 2001, Section 15(a) of China’s 
WTO accession protocol allows WTO members to treat China as an NME in anti-
dumping investigations, which is specified as follows: 
“(a) In determining price comparability under Article VI of the GATT 1994 and the 
Anti-Dumping Agreement, the importing WTO Member shall use either Chinese prices 
or costs for the industry under investigation or a methodology that is not based on a 
strict comparison with domestic prices or costs in China based on the following rules:  
(i) If the producers under investigation can clearly show that market economy 
conditions prevail in the industry producing the like product with regard to 
the manufacture, production and sale of that product, the importing WTO 
Member shall use Chinese prices or costs for the industry under investigation 
in determining price comparability;  
(ii) The importing WTO Member may use a methodology that is not based on a 
strict comparison with domestic prices or costs in China if the producers 
under investigation cannot clearly show that market economy conditions 
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prevail in the industry producing the like product with regard to manufacture, 
production and sale of that product.”  
The protocol also specifies in Section 15(d) that the non-market economy treatment 
should expire 15 years after the date of accession in any event, which shall guarantee 
the market economy treatment to China in any case after December 11, 2016. 
“(d) Once China has established, under the national law of the importing WTO 
Member, that it is a market economy, the provisions of subparagraph (a) shall be 
terminated provided that the importing Member's national law contains market 
economy criteria as of the date of accession. In any event, the provisions of 
subparagraph (a)(ii) shall expire 15 years after the date of accession. In addition, 
should China establish, pursuant to the national law of the importing WTO Member, 
that market economy conditions prevail in a particular industry or sector, the non-
market economy provisions of subparagraph (a) shall no longer apply to that industry 
or sector.” 
However, 15 years have passed. As government and state-owned enterprises still 
play a decisive role in the Chinese market, China is still far away from a full market 
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economy. The contradiction in the current NME status and the specification in Section 
15(d) that grants market economy status to China in any event makes it an unsolved 
controversial dispute regarding China’s NME treatment. As of December 2017, a total 
of 81 countries 2  around the world recognize China’s market economy status. 
Nonetheless, the country’s major trade partners including the U.S., the EU and Japan 
have not yet done so although China has been continuously making effort to strive for 
its market economy status.  
The NME status put China in disadvantage in anti-dumping investigations as the 
surrogate country approach allows importing countries to disregard the domestic prices 
or costs in China and use a third-country’s price in determining the normal value of 
Chinese exports, which inevitably leads to distortion and inflation in anti-dumping duty 
rates. 
Also, the country faces a frequent problem of double remedies. Double remedy refers 
to the potential double remedy actions when an exporting country receives anti-
dumping and countervailing duty investigations simultaneously for the same product. 
                         
2 Ni Hongfu, Commentary: China’s development deserves market economy status, People’s Daily, 12. 20. 2017 
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When a subsidy affects both the normal value and export price of a good, the use of 
surrogate normal value fails to capture the impact of the subsidy on the normal value 
of the exporting country. Theoretically, anti-dumping duty is increased by the amount 
of subsidy that has artificially lowered the export price and countervailing duty should 
equal to the amount of the subsidy. The anti-dumping duty using such surrogate 
methodology double-counts the subsidy by the amount of the countervailing duty (Lee, 
2017). However, surrogates for normal value are not only restricted to NME but also 
widely used in market economies. Thus, even if China gets fully recognized as a market 
economy, the current double-count issue can still prevail (Kelly, 2014). 
Facing skyrocket in anti-dumping and countervailing tariffs as well as continuous 
uncertainty in NME treatment, many Chinese manufacturing firms have responded by 
shutting production at home and shifting plants overseas. For example, in response to 
the recent steep levies on steel from the U.S. and EU, Chinese steelmakers have signed 
agreements to build plants in Malaysia, Pakistan and India where anti-dumping tariffs 
are few. This suggests the potential existence of tariff-jumping FDI in the case of China, 
which will be discussed in the later sections.  
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2. Chinese Outward FDI 
China has been one of the largest FDI recipient countries for decades. But it has not 
been a long history since China started actively engaging in foreign direct investment. 
It was not until 1979 when outward FDI was initially permitted under the “Open Door” 
policies that China started to see a gradual increase in its investment overseas. 
Especially after the government-led “going global” initiation in 1992 and the country’s 
accession to the WTO in 2001, China’s OFDI has been surging rapidly and reached its 
peak in 2016 with an annual investment value of 196.15 billion USD. In 2017, the 
country ranked second place in total OFDI stock and third place in OFDI flow. China 
has successfully become one of the largest FDI home countries in the world. 
Table 2. China’s Annual Outward FDI Flows and Stock, 2002-2017 









2002 2.70 26  29.90 25 
2003 2.85 21 5.6 33.20 25 
2004 5.50 20 93.0 44.80 27 
2005 12.26 17 122.9 57.20 24 
2006 21.16 13 43.8 90.63 23 
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2007 26.51 17 25.3 117.91 22 
2008 55.91 12 110.9 183.97 18 
2009 56.53 5 1.1 245.75 16 
2010 68.81 5 21.7 317.21 17 
2011 74.65 6 8.5 424.78 13 
2012 87.80 3 17.6 531.94 13 
2013 107.84 3 22.8 660.48 11 
2014 123.12 3 14.2 882.64 8 
2015 145.67 2 18.3 1097.86 8 
2016 196.15 2 34.7 1357.39 6 
2017 158.29 3 -19.3 1809.04 2 
Source: Statistical Bulletin of China’s Outward Foreign Direct Investment (2017) 
Notes: Data for 2002-2005 includes only non-financial outward FDI, and data for 2006-2017 includes 
outward FDI in all industries. Annual growth rate for the year 2006 refers to that of the non-financial 
outward FDI. Second to fourth columns from the left show statistics for flow value which occurs in the 
current period, and the last two columns show statistics for stock value which is the accumulative value 
of the current period and the past.  
 
Figure 3. China’s FDI Inflow and Outflow Comparison, 2002-2017 
(unit: Billion USD) 
 







2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017
FDI inflow FDI outflow
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Geographically, a majority of Chinese OFDI goes to Asian countries and regions 
with geographical and cultural proximity, such as Hong Kong China, Singapore, 
Indonesia, Macau China, Kazakhstan, Laos, South Korea, etc. According to the 2017 
Statistical Bulletin of China’s Outward Foreign Direct Investment published by 
Ministry of Commerce, PRC, by the end of 2017, China’s OFDI stock in Asia reached 
1139.32 billion USD, accounting for 63% of total OFDI stock value. Latin America 
ranked second with a total amount of 386.89 billion USD, accounting for 21.4%. This 
is mainly due to vast scale of investment in Cayman Islands, a popular tax haven for 
large MNEs. Europe, North America, Africa and Oceania rank third to sixth in order. 
By the end of 2017, over 85% of China’s OFDI stock has gone to developing countries 
with a total amount of 1552.42 billion USD, of which Hong Kong China accounts for 
63.2% followed by ASEAN countries with 5.7%. OFDI stock in developed countries 
reached 229.13 billion USD, accounting for 12.7% of the total. In particular, the 
European Union and the U.S. account for 37.5% and 29.4% respectively.  
Table 3. Top 20 Destinations of China’s OFDI Stock, by the End of 2017 
No. Country (Region) Amount (billion USD) Share (%) 
1 Hong Kong China  981.27 54.2 
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2 Cayman Islands 249.68 13.8 
3 British Virgin Islands 122.06 6.7 
4 United States 67.38 3.7 
5 Singapore 44.57 2.5 
6 Australia 36.18 2.0 
7 United Kingdom 20.32 1.1 
8 Netherlands 18.53 1.0 
9 Luxembourg 13.94 0.8 
10 Russia 13.87 0.8 
11 Germany 12.16 0.7 
12 Canada 10.94 0.6 
13 Indonesia 10.54 0.6 
14 Macao China 9.68 0.5 
15 Bermuda 8.59 0.5 
16 Switzerland 8.11 0.5 
17 Kazakhstan 7.56 0.4 
18 South Africa 7.47 0.4 
19 Sweden 7.31 0.4 
20 Laos 6.65 0.4 
 Total 1656.80 91.6 
Source: Statistical Bulletin of China’s Outward Foreign Direct Investment (2017) 
Notes: Stock value means the accumulative value of the current period and the past.   
In terms of industry distribution, China’s OFDI has covered all sectors of the national 
economy as of the end of 2017. Almost 80% of the total the investment goes to the 
service industry. In particular, leasing and business services sector tops the rank with 
an accumulated amount of 615.77 billion USD, accounting for 34.1% of the total stock. 
Wholesale and retail trade, information transmission, software and IT services come 
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second and third, with an amount of 226.43 and 218.90 billion USD each. 
Manufacturing sector amount 140.06 billion USD, accounting for 7.8% of the total 
stock.  
Table 4. Industrial Distribution of China’s OFDI Stock, by the End of 2017 
Industry  Amount (billion USD) Share (%) 
Leasing and business services 615.77 34.1 
Wholesale and retail trade 226.43 12.5 
Information transmission, software and IT services 218.90 12.1 
Financial services 202.79 11.2 
Mining  157.67 8.7 
Manufacturing  140.30 7.8 
Transportation, storage and postal services 54.77 3 
Real estate 53.76 3 
Construction  33.70 1.9 
Production and supply of electricity, heat, gas and 
water 
24.99 1.4 
Scientific research and technical services 21.68 1.2 
Resident services, repairs and other services 19.02 1.1 
Agriculture, forestry, animal husbandry and fishery 16.56 0.9 
Culture, sports and entertainment 8.12 0.5 
Hotels and catering  3.51 0.2 
Education  3.29 0.2 
Water conservancy, environment and public facility 
management  
2.39 0.1 
Health and social work 1.39 0.1 
Total  1805.04 100 
Source: Statistical Bulletin of China’s Outward Foreign Direct Investment (2017) 
Notes: Stock value means the accumulative value of the current period and the past.   
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It is worth noting that mergers and acquisitions (M&A) account for a large proportion 
in China’s OFDI in contrast to greenfield investment. In 2017, Chinese enterprises 
conducted 431 M&As in 56 countries, recorded a total amount of 119.62 billion USD 
and 75.6% of the total FDI outflow. Therefore, it would be inappropriate to exclude 
M&A transactions in analyzing Chinese outward FDI. This paper takes a broad sense 
of FDI definition given by OECD, that is the direct or indirect ownership of 10% or 
more of the voting power of an enterprise resident in one economy by an investor 
resident in another economy, regardless of the form of investment (M&A or greenfield). 
There have been many existing studies on the determinants for FDI. Nonetheless, 
scholars have not yet reached an agreement on the general equation for FDI 
determinants in empirical studies. The mainstream location determinants of FDI is 
encapsulated in Dunning’s OLI3 framework that firms pursue FDI in seek of market, 
efficiency, natural resources and strategic asset (Dunning, 1977a, 1993b). Market 
seeking FDI is usually undertaken by firms to facilitate exports to larger and more 
rapidly growing overseas market. Efficiency seeking FDI occurs when MNEs seek 
                         
3 OLI stands for Ownership, Location and Internalization. 
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cheap labor in the host countries to lower production cost. Natural resources seeking 
FDI, as it explained in its name, occurs to acquire the supply of energy resources or raw 
materials in the host countries. Strategic asset seeking FDI usually happens in FDI from 
developing economies to developed ones, where MNEs seek specific asset of strategic 
importance such as certain technology, R&D capacity, industrial knowledge, brand 
names, etc. Besides, other studies have also identified the economic and business 
environment of the (potential) host countries as well as FDI-related policies pursued by 
their governments as variables that affect FDI decision. These variables include policy 
liberalization, political risk, exchange rate, host country inflation rate, exports, imports, 
openness to FDI, etc. (Buckley et al., 2007) Geographic and psychic distance are also 
regarded as important determinants in FDI decision (e.g. Johanson and Vahlne, 1977).  
Regarding the specific explanations of Chinese OFDI, scholars have found evidences 
of consistency as well as idiosyncrasies to the traditional FDI theory mentioned above. 
Buckley et al. (2007) find Chinese OFDI associated with high levels of political risk, 
cultural proximity, host market size and geographic proximity during the period of 
1984-1991 and a high level of natural resource endowments in the host countries during 
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1992-2001. Kolstad and Wigg (2010) use a dataset in a period of 2003-2006 and find 
Chinese OFDI attracted to countries with large markets, abundant natural resources and 
poor institutions. Zhang and Daly (2011) find China’s overseas investments positively 
correlated to international trade, market size, economic growth, degree of openness and 
natural resource endowment. Some scholars have also pointed out the crucial role 
government played in shaping the structure of China’s OFDI because any Chinese 
investment overseas has to go through a long and complex procedure of approval (Deng, 
2004; Buckley et al., 2007).  
Nevertheless, there has not yet been a conclusion regarding the role of trade barrier 
as an incentive for Chinese outward FDI. Using bilateral investment data on a country 
level from 1995 to 2006, Du and Zhou (2010) find empirical evidence that trade barrier 
represented by anti-dumping and tariff is one of the inducing factors of Chinese OFDI. 
Shi and Li (2017) also confirm the tariff-jumping purpose of Chinese OFDI in the U.S. 
based on the industrial distribution. Meanwhile GDP is also found to be an important 
variable on FDI decision. However, Xu (2011) suggests that China's overseas direct 
investments do not have the function of avoiding trade remedy measures as many of 
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them go to countries with few previous trade remedy measures. This paper aims to add 
to the existing literatures and uncover the relationship between trade remedy measures 
and Chinese OFDI with most recent empirical evidence.  
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IV. Model and Empirical Strategy 
This section presents the empirical strategy used to test whether tariff-jumping FDI 
exists in the case of Chinese OFDI. In other words, this study aims to answer the 
question of whether Chinese OFDI is induced by the use of trade remedy investigations. 
Hypothetically, trade remedy investigations in the past period is supposed to lead to 
more tariff-jumping FDI in the future period according to the tariff-jumping FDI theory. 
The causal relationship can be simply presented as more remediest-n → more FDIt. In 
this study, a panel dataset of Chinese OFDI in 28 partner countries and regions from 
2005 to 2015 is used. Table 5 presents the codes and OECD membership of the 28 
sample countries (regions).  
Table 5. Sample Countries (Regions) and OECD Membership 
Country (region) Code OECD 
membership 
Country (region) Code OECD 
membership 
Argentina ARG N Malaysia   MYS N 
Australia AUS Y New Zealand NZL Y 
Brazil BRA N Pakistan  PAK N 
Canada CAN Y Peru   PER N 
Chile  CHI Y Philippines  PHL N 
Colombia  COL N Russia RUS N 
European Union EUN Y Thailand  THA N 
Indonesia  IDN N Trinidad and Tobago  TTO N 
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India  IND N Turkey  TUR Y 
Israel  ISR Y Ukraine  UKR N 
Jamaica  JAM N Uruguay  URY N 
Japan  JAP Y USA USA Y 
South Korea KOR Y Venezuela  VEN N 
Mexico  MEX Y South Africa ZAF N 
Notes: N for non-OECD countries and Y for OECD countries. 
Based on Du and Zhou’s (2010) and Blonigen and Feenstra’s (1997) model, the 
baseline model is specified as follows: 
OFDIit = α + β1CUM_REMit-n + β2 ln EXPit-1  + β3 ln GDPit-1  + 
 β
4
ENEit-1 + β5EXRit-1+ β6PATit-1 + β7TARt-1 + β8TREit-1 + β9RISit-1 + ε 
where t denotes year, i denotes partner country, n denotes lagged period of time and 𝜀 
stands for the error term. 
  The dependent variable, OFDI uses the real annual outward FDI flow value from 
China to partner country in million USD.  
CUM_REM and REM represent the number of trade remedy investigations targeting 
China. Previous studies have applied standard probit models to estimate the “threat” of 
protectionism using the probability of affirmative AD or CVD decisions. Unlike past 
studies, a simpler count of investigations regardless of result (affirmative or withdraw) 
is used in this study. This is because considering a past overall affirmative rate of over 
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73% in the case of Chinese exports, there is a large chance that most investigations will 
turn out to be affirmative. Thus, this paper assumes MNEs’ decision making is affected 
by all investigations no matter actual final measures put into action or not. Two 
different measures are used in this study: accumulative number and current number. 
For accumulative number, sum of all past AD, CVD investigations and safeguard 





1980 , t=2005, 2006, …, 2015, n=0, 1, 3, 5. 
Alternatively, Remedies, a simple count of remedy investigation in one year is also used. 
Lagged periods of n (0, 1, 3 and 5) years are considered as well since the actual 
implementation of FDI may take years to complete upon one trade remedy investigation. 
For all other independent variables, current variables are used when n=0, and lag of 
only one period is used because the impact of these variables is regarded as more instant.  
LnEXP is the logarithm of annual export value from China to the host country. As 
FDI can be established to support or substitute export, a positive sign would suggest a 
supplementary role of FDI to trade whereas a negative sign would in reverse indicate a 
substitution effect.  
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LnGDP is used as a proxy for host country market size. As Dunning’s OLI theory 
indicates, a larger foreign market attracts more investment. Logarithm is taken for GDP 
variable.  
ENE represents energy resources. Primary energy production, namely oil, gas and 
coal production are used as a proxy for resource abundance to test the resources seeking 
motivation.  
EXR stands for the annual average exchange rate of Chinese yuan, which is used as 
a proxy for the economic conditions in the home country. Appreciation in the buyer’s 
currency would increase its purchasing power, thus stimulating more investment 
overseas. 
PAT represents the number of patents filed in the partner country, which is used as a 
proxy for the technology level in the host country. A significant positive coefficient 
would indicate a tendency of strategic asset seeking FDI.  
TAR refers to the tariff level of the host country. Simple means of MFN tariffs are 
used in order to test to what extent tariff as a trade barrier can restrain trade and 
stimulate FDI. 
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TRE is a dummy variable that shows the effect of bilateral investment treaty. 1 is 
assigned to countries with bilateral investment treaties with China while 0 is assigned 
to the those without. Investment treaty indicates better institutional framework that 
protects investors’ interest. Therefore, a positive sign is expected. 
Finally, RIS refers to the political risk in the host country. High political risk is 
generally associated with low investment as it discourages firms from high level of 
resource commitment. However, higher risk may also indicate higher returns. Thus, the 
relationship between risk and FDI still remains a question. In this study, a political risk 
index ranged from 0 to 1 is used as a proxy for the risk factor. A higher figure indicates 
lower risk in this dataset. 
The following table summarizes the variables, expected sign, theoretical justification 
and data source.  
Table 6. Variable Explanation 
Variable 
name 





OFDI Annual outflow value of Chinese 
FDI 






CUM_REM Accumulated number of past 
protectionist measures (AD, 












REM Number of protectionist 
measures (AD, CVD and 












lnEXP Logarithm of annual export value 









ENE Annual primary energy 





Review of World 
Energy 









PAT Total (resident and non-resident) 
annual number of patents filed in 











TRE Dummy variable: 0 for countries 
without bilateral investment 
treaty; 1 for countries with 





RIS Political risk index of host 
country (range from 0 to 1, 
higher level indicates high 
stability) 







Notes: Expected signs and theoretical justification are based on Blonigen and Feenstra (1997), Dunning 
(1977, 1993, 2004), Buckley et al. (2007) and Du and Zhou (2010). 
Despite of the simplicity of the OLS model, a couple of adjustments have to be made 
to address some potential simultaneity problems suggested by the quid pro quo FDI 
theory. As discussed above, quid pro quo FDI theory suggests that tariff-jumping FDI 
may occur to defuse the use of remedies in the future. It is possible that reverse causality 
between FDI and remedy exists. In this case, coefficients from OLS models may suffer 
from an upward bias. To address such endogenous problem, lagged remedies are used 
in this study under the assumption that today’s FDI should not affect lagged remedies. 
Because FDI does not usually response immediately upon a remedy investigation, 
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current period variables as well as lagged remedies of 1, 3 and 5 time periods are used 
in each case to test the robustness of the result. However, one should note that lagged 
variables are not perfect solution to such endogenous bias but only reduce the problem 
to an extent. Ideally, 2SLS regression with an instrumental variable is a more preferable 
choice. Also, country fixed effect (FE) and time fixed effect are used to eliminate the 
effect of some unobserved country and time specific characteristics. In order to further 
analyze the distinction between investment in developed and developing countries, the 
data is then divided into two subgroups by OECD membership and tested separately. 
Table 7 below presents the variance inflation factor (VIF) test result based on one-
period lagged baseline model. None of the VIF exceeds 10, which indicates no 
multicollinearity problem in the model. 
Table 7. Variance Inflation Factor Test 
Variable Explanation  VIF 1/VIF 
lnGDP Logarithm of GDP 6.33 0.157978 
lnEXP Logarithm of export 4.32 0.231341 
ENE Energy 2.60 0.384937 
RIS Political risk 2.49 0.402362 
CUM_REM Accumulative remedies 2.45 0.407543 
PAT Patent 2.23 0.448145 
TAR Tariff 2.06 0.484696 
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TRE Investment treaty  1.52 0.658205 
EXR Exchange rate 1.10 0.906868s 
Mean VIF  2.79  
Notes: Variables with one-period lagged are used for the VIF test. 
Preliminary results based on summaries of data statistics and kernel density 
distribution of OFDI (logarithm) confirm the tariff-jumping FDI hypothesis to some 
extent. Table 9 and Figure 4 suggest that countries with remedy (AD, CVD and SFG) 
investigations in the past tend to attract more FDI from China compared to those 
without. The scatterplot in Figure 5 shows a positive correlation between accumulative 
remedy investigations and OFDI (logarithm), which also confirms the hypothesis. The 
author will proceed on more solid regression results in the next section.  
Table 8. Summary Statistics for OFDI by Remedy Measures 
 AD CVD SFG Remedies Total 
 N Y N Y N Y N Y  
Mean  116.4 888.9 196.5 1519.7 293.4 1253.7 130.1 828.1 636.4 
Median  9.5 193.1 40.7 344.0 46.5 213.1 9.2 176.3 94.2 
S.D. 342.8 2004.1 394.6 2681.1 679.4 2577.6 369.3 1943.0 1694.0 
Count 119 245 243 121 234 130 100 264 364 
Notes: For each measure, N stands for statistics for countries without such remedy investigations against 
China and Y stands for statistics for countries with such remedy investigations against China.  
 
Figure 4. OFDI (Logarithm) Distribution by Remedy Measures 
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Notes: Each of the graphs shows distributions of logarithm of Chinese OFDI value in countries with and 
without corresponding remedy investigations, where blue lines suggest overall higher values for 
countries that have remedy investigations against China while red dot lines suggest overall lower values 
for countries without. Remedies is calculated as the sum of AD, CVD and SFG. 
 
Figure 5. Scatterplot of OFDI (Logarithm) and Remedies 
 
Notes: The scatterplots suggest there is positive correlation between OFDI and Accumulative remedies 
as well as remedies in the current period.  
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IV. Results  
Table 9 shows the estimation results for OFDI with Accumulative remedies. Column 
(1) through (4) report results with 0, 1, 3 and 5-period lagged Accumulative remedies 
respectively. Accumulated past remedy investigations have found to be statistically 
significant and positive for all four cases, which confirms the hypothesis that trade 
remedies lead to more FDI in the case of China. Among (1) to (4), 1-period lagged 
remedy shows the highest statistical significance, and the coefficients increase 
substantially in column (2) to (4) compared to the contemporary value in column (1). 
This confirms the expectation that it takes time for FDI to respond to remedy measures. 
Also, larger coefficients in (2) to (4) show consistency to the quid pro quo FDI theory 
and suggest a potential downward bias in the contemporary model shown in column 
(1).  
For other variables, Export suggests a negative correlation with FDI, which indicates 
a substitution effect of FDI to export. GDP shows positive and significant results in all 
cases, suggesting market-seeking FDI is one of the most important motivations for 
Chines OFDI. Energy also exhibits a positive and significant effect in all cases, which 
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suggests that Chinese OFDI is attracted to countries with rich natural resources. 
Exchange rate shows a negative significant correlation, which confirms the hypothesis 
that appreciation in Chinese yuan increases Chinese investors’ purchasing power and 
thus stimulating Chinese OFDI. Also, Investment treaty shows positive and significant 
correlation with FDI from (1) to (3), which is consistent to the expectation as well. 
However, contrary to previous expectation, Tariff suggests a negative coefficient. This 
may be explained by the global trade liberalization move in recent decades. Up to today, 
most developed economies have already lowered tariffs to a great extent in general and 
tariff is no longer a commonly used trade barrier as it used to be. In fact, the so-called 
“tariff-jumping” FDI should be more properly rephrased as “remedy-jumping” FDI 
given the above results in this study. Patent and Political risk are not found to have 
significant influence on OFDI. 
Table 9. Estimation Results for Accumulative Remedy Effect on OFDI 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Accumulative 
remedies_lag0 
8.216***    
 [4.412]    
Accumulative 
remedies_lag1 
 10.40***   
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  [4.458]   
Accumulative 
remedies_lag3 
  11.80***  
   [4.169]  
Accumulative 
remedies_lag5 
   12.96*** 
    [3.685] 
Logarithm of export -45.63 -235.3** -282.3** -283.2* 
 [-0.577] [-2.374] [-2.260] [-1.962] 
Logarithm of GDP 136.6 227.9* 289.4** 299.1* 
 [1.449] [1.930] [2.094] [1.945] 
Energy 0.682*** 1.007*** 1.200*** 1.548*** 
 [3.373] [3.972] [4.191] [4.657] 
Export -72.60** -140.7*** -106.9** -84.97* 
 [-2.352] [-3.638] [-2.360] [-1.658] 
Patent 8.46e-05 0.00167* 0.00164 0.00201 
 [0.111] [1.750] [1.471] [1.540] 
Tariff -54.55** -71.14** -75.99** -70.72* 
 [-2.334] [-2.428] [-2.267] [-1.866] 
Investment treaty 422.6** 493.0** 462.2* 408.3 
 [2.249] [2.094] [1.683] [1.288] 
Political risk -307.4 -273.8 148.4 625.6 
 [-0.491] [-0.349] [0.162] [0.591] 
Constant 15.83 275.6 -408.4 -940.2 
 [0.0248] [0.344] [-0.435] [-0.883] 
 









Observations 290 290 237 182 
R-squared 0.415 0.474 0.522 0.598 
Notes: ***, ** and * indicate significance at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively. T-statistics are included in 
the brackets. Column (1) to (4) exhibits regression results with 0-, 1-, 3- and 5-period-lagged variables. 
For column (1), contemporary values are used for all variables. For column (2) to (4), except for 
Accumulative remedies, 1-period-lagged values are used for all other variables.  
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Table 10 shows the results after replacing accumulative remedy with current remedy 
counts in corresponding periods. In general, similar results of all key variables are 
observed in the two tables, which confirms the robustness of this study. Compared to 
coefficients of Accumulative remedies in table 10, larger coefficients for Remedies in 
(5) to (8) may suggest a stronger effect of more recent remedies than past ones in 
economic sense. 
Table 10. Estimation Results for Current Period Remedy Effect on OFDI 
 (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Remedies_lag0 46.60***    
 [4.475]    
Remedies_lag1  77.22***   
  [6.078]   
Remedies_lag3   78.19***  
   [4.621]  
Remedies_lag5    90.42*** 
    [4.202] 
Logarithm of export -52.27 -235.1** -286.4** -289.7** 
 [-0.662] [-2.442] [-2.315] [-2.033] 
Logarithm of GDP 236.5** 357.5*** 413.9*** 425.3*** 
 [2.576] [3.191] [3.097] [2.876] 
Energy 0.637*** 0.770*** 1.076*** 1.419*** 
 [3.086] [3.057] [3.698] [4.232] 
Exchange rate -72.28** -129.0*** -98.42** -90.27* 
 [-2.344] [-3.429] [-2.181] [-1.786] 
Patent -0.000838 0.000118 0.000538 0.000915 
 36 
 [-1.056] [0.121] [0.472] [0.690] 
Tariff -40.78* -59.05** -69.96** -71.80* 
 [-1.795] [-2.130] [-2.132] [-1.923] 
Investment treaty 614.2*** 832.7*** 767.6*** 662.9** 
 [3.144] [3.494] [2.688] [2.046] 
Political risk -340.4 -563.6 -115.7 384.7 
 [-0.544] [-0.738] [-0.126] [0.365] 
Constant -693.0 -622.7 -1,187 -1,565 











Observations 290 290 237 182 
R-squared 0.416 0.502 0.530 0.607 
Notes: ***, ** and * indicate significance at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively. T-statistics are included in 
the brackets. Column (5) to (8) exhibits regression results with 0-, 1-, 3- and 5-period-lagged variables. 
For column (5), contemporary values are used for all variables. For column (6) to (8), except for 
Accumulative remedies, 1-period-lagged values are used for all other variables.  
Based on the one-period lagged model (column (2)), country and time fixed effects 
are then added to the model. Column (9) and (10) presents the result respectively. 
Accumulated past remedies still exhibit positive results in both cases. Export also 
shows consistent results as previous models. However, GDP, Energy, Tariff and 
Investment treaty lose significance in country fixed effect model. This suggests that 
controlling country specific factors, GDP, Energy, Tariff and Investment treaty do not 
play significant roles in determining FDI. It is easy to understand as these variables 
tend to be country specific and do not change much across time. It is also worth noting 
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that Patent shows positive significant coefficients in both models, which means 
Chinese businesses tend to invest in countries with higher technology level.  
Table 11. Estimation Results for OFDI with Country and Time Fixed Effect 
 (9) (10) 
Accumulative remedies 35.01*** 8.503*** 
 [5.680] [3.536] 
Logarithm of export -309.0*** -434.2*** 
 [-2.808] [-3.633] 
Logarithm of GDP -524.3 397.9*** 
 [-0.583] [3.038] 
Energy -1.671 1.097*** 
 [-0.968] [4.311] 
Exchange rate -90.17** (omitted) 
 [-2.208] - 
Patent 0.0325*** 0.00193** 
 [6.766] [2.009] 
Tariff -28.80 -54.72* 
 [-0.547] [-1.842] 
Investment treaty -690.1 589.5** 
 [-0.931] [2.482] 
Political risk 3,548 73.47 
 [1.391] [0.0930] 
Constant 1,104 -1,617* 










Observations 290 290 
R-squared 0.505 0.453 
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Number of COUNTRY 28  
Number of YEAR  11 
Notes: ***, ** and * indicate significance at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively. T-statistics are included in 
the brackets. Column (9) shows regression result with country fixed effect and column (10) shows result 
with time fixed effect. One-period lagged values are used for all independent variables. 
The dataset is then divided into two subgroups by OECD membership and 
regressions are run for each. Table 12 presents the result. It is worth noting that the 
coefficient for Accumulative remedies increases almost 6 times for OECD countries 
while it changes to negative and loses significance for non-OECD members. More 
significant results are observed in column (11) than in column (12). Also, R-squared 
increases from 0.474 in column (2) to 0.691 in column (11) for OECD members while 
it drops to only 0.249 for non-OECD members in column (12). This means that in fact 
the protection-induced FDI only exists in developed economies. Variables identified in 
this paper have stronger explanatory power for Chinese investment in developed 
countries than in developing countries. In other words, FDI motivation may be different 
for investment in LDCs. The visualized results in Figure 6 provide a more intuitive 
contrast. It is not hard to understand because most of the investigations actually come 
from wealthier countries such as the U.S. and the EU whereas LDCs often suffer from 
lack of fund and know-how to initiate such investigations. Besides, a sharp contrast in 
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Energy between the two subgroup is also found. A negative coefficient in the OECD 
subgroup suggests that Chinese companies do not seem to seek natural resources in 
developed economies. While they do search for resources in less developed economies 
as the coefficient in the non-OECD subgroup turns positive in column (12). What’s 
more, export plays a different role in OECD and non-OECD countries. Although 
insignificant, a negative sign in OECD subgroup suggests a substitution effect whereas 
a positive sign in non-OECD subgroup suggests a supplementary effect. This may 
reflect that Chinese firms’ investment tends to be horizontal FDI in developed 
economies where they replicate full production process in the host country and aim to 
service overseas market through local production. However, investment in developing 
countries tends to be vertical where production process is separated into different stages 
through offshoring and is aimed to facilitate export. 
Table 12. Estimation Results for Subgroups (OECD and Non-OECD Members) 
 (11) (12) 
Accumulative remedies 58.02*** -1.797 
 [6.575] [-1.166] 
Logarithm of export -260.0 39.04 
 [-1.338] [0.700] 
Logarithm of GDP 250.8 88.53 
 40 
 [1.071] [1.082] 
Energy -2.880*** 0.602** 
 [-2.825] [2.453] 
Exchange rate -197.7** -45.60** 
 [-2.584] [-2.284] 
Patent 0.000565 -0.0103 
 [0.399] [-1.283] 
Tariff 17.17 12.36 
 [0.259] [0.814] 
Investment treaty 998.2* 212.5 
 [1.918] [1.558] 
Political risk 8,198*** -239.3 
 [3.602] [-0.396] 
Constant -7,951*** -160.9 
 [-3.287] [-0.270] 
   
OECD Membership Y N 
Observations 118 172 
R-squared 0.691 0.212 
Notes: ***, ** and * indicate significance at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively. T-statistics are included in 
the brackets. Column (11) shows regression result in OECD country subgroup and column (12) shows 
result in non-OECD country subgroup. One-period lagged values are used for all independent variables. 
 
Figure 6. Scatterplot of OFDI and Remedies in OECD and Non-OECD Countries 
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Notes: OFDI and remedies are calculated as the average value between 2005 and 2015. The scatterplots 
and best fitted lines suggest much more prominent correlation between OFDI and remedies exists in 




V. Conclusion  
1. Implications  
This paper investigates the validity of the tariff-jumping FDI theory for Chinese 
OFDI. Using a country-level panel dataset, the paper finds strong evidence that tariff 
jumping is one of the most important inducements of Chinese OFDI. Non-tariff 
protectionist measure represented by AD, CVD and safeguard can lead to more Chinese 
overseas investment. This is particularly true for investment in more developed 
economies when comparing results in OECD and non-OECD country groups. 
Protection-induced FDI is in fact concentrated only in developed economies where 
most of the investigations come from. Other controlled variables suggest market size, 
natural resource and Chinese yuan exchange rate level are also crucial determinants in 
Chinese OFDI. These findings suggest that Chinese MNEs tend to search for larger 
markets in developed countries and natural resources in developing countries, which 
can be explained by the fact that horizontal FDI is more prevalent in developed 




The author acknowledges some limitations in this paper. 
First, this paper suffers from a problem of data availability. In this paper, an 
aggregated country level FDI dataset is used. However, it would be preferable to use 
disaggregated industry or firm level data since trade remedy investigations target at 
specific products. Further research on disaggregated firm level investment can provide 
more precise and in-depth analysis on the relationship between trade remedies and FDI. 
Second, as mentioned above, because an aggregated country level dataset is used, 
investment in service industry which does not subject to AD or CVD investigation is 
also included in this study. This will inevitably affect the reliability of the models as 
FDI in these sectors is certainly not induced by trade remedies. 
Third, there is a chance that some companies may respond to protectionist measures 
by building plants in and exporting from a third country where they face few 
investigations. The models specified in this paper cannot capture such cases. More 
detailed firm-level export data would be needed to identify such investment.  
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Fourth, this paper falls short in country and time period coverage. As is suggested in 
the results, tariff-jumping FDI can be much more prominent in host countries with 
higher economy development level. Also, the pattern of Chinese OFDI may have 
changed over time. Further research on Chinese OFDI in specific countries or regions 
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본 논문은 무역구제(trade remedy)가 중국 해외직접투자(OFDI)의 자극제로 
작용하는데 대한 메커니즘을 검토하고자 한다. 보호 유도로 인한 
외국인직접투자(FDI), 즉 관세회피투자(tariff-jumping FDI)는 FDI 의 가장 
일반적인 설명 중 하나임에도 불구하고, 지금까지의 중국 OFDI 
결정요인에 대한 기존의 연구는 주로 시장, 자원, 그리고 전략적 자산이 
목적인 것에 초점을 맞추고 있다. 이러한 배경에서, 본 논문은 국가 수준의 
패널 데이터를 사용하여 시차 변수(lagged variable) 및 고정 효과(fixed 
effect)로 선형회귀분석(OLS)을 실행함으로써 중국의 관세회피투자의 
존재를 확인하였다. 이외에 시장 규모, 에너지, 수출, 환율 수준은 중국 
OFDI 에도 큰 영향을 미치는 것으로 나타났다. 이 논문은 또한 OEDC 와 
비 OECD 하위 그룹으로부터 선진국과 개발도상국에서 중국 OFDI 의 다른 
패턴을 발견하였다.  
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